The multiple access channel with confidential messages (MAC-CM) generalizes the traditional multiple access channel by allowing both users to receive channel outputs. Achievable secrecy rate region of this model has been established using random coding arguments, whereas practical codes design remains to be further discussed. In this paper, we develop an explicit polar coding scheme that achieves the secrecy rate region of the MAC-CM under strong secrecy. In particular, our scheme mainly relies on monotone chain rules and polar coding techniques for single-user channels. A proper chaining scheme is constructed to align polar indices and to provide strong secrecy. Finally, a rigorous analysis is provided to validate the performance of our scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of physical-layer security, fundamental limits of secure transmission over wiretap channels have been studied extensively [1] - [3] . The multiple access channel with confidential messages (MAC-CM) [4] , [5] is one of the multiuser wiretap channels, which generalizes the traditional MAC by allowing both users to receive channel outputs. In this model, each user may extract confidential information of the other user from the channel outputs it receives. Hence, each user views the other user as an eavesdropper and intends to keep its confidential information concealed from the other user. The best-known inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the MAC-CM was obtained in [4] based on random coding arguments. The problem of designing practical codes for this model has not yet been addressed in the literature.
Polar codes, introduced by Arıkan [6] , are the first class of provable capacity-achieving codes for binary-input symmetric memoryless channels with low coding complexity. Over the past decade, polar codes have gained significant attention and have been extended to a large variety of scenarios including MACs [7] - [11] and wiretap channels [12] - [18] . In this The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Wei Xu .
paper, we are motivated to develop an explicit coding scheme for the MAC-CM using polar codes.
A. RELATED WORKS
Polar coding for MACs was first discussed in [7] , in which a MAC polarization approach was proposed for two-user MACs. This approach was later extended to m-user MACs [8] and MACs with input alphabet of arbitrary size [9] . One problem is that it does not always achieve the whole secrecy capacity region of MACs. Along another line, Arıkan [19] introduced a scheme for the Slepian-Wolf problem based on monotone chain rules. This alternate scheme only relies on the polarization of single-user channels, and has been shown to achieve the dominant face of the uniform rate region for two-user MACs [10] and m-user MACs [11] . In this paper, we also adopt monotone chain rules in our scheme for the MAC-CM.
Polar codes that achieve secrecy capacity have been proposed for degraded wiretap channels [12] - [15] , general wiretap channels [16] - [18] and other extended wiretap scenarios [20] - [24] . The multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WT) [25] is the other type of MACs with secrecy constraints, in which the eavesdropper is an external receiver. Polar coding for the MAC-WT can be found in [15] , [16] , [20] . Specifically, [16] utilizes monotone chain rules to construct the coding scheme for the MAC-WT satisfying weak secrecy. Another work worth mentioning is [21] , which considers the two-way wiretap channel. The coding scheme in [21] also utilizes monotone chain rules in that the eavesdropper sees a MAC in the model.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we develop an explicit polar coding scheme that achieves the secrecy rate region of the MAC-CM [4] . In particular, we prove strong secrecy for the model. Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
• The secrecy rate region of the MAC-CM mainly consists of three sub-regions, for which two coding schemes are proposed separately. (i) When both users achieve positive secrecy rates, we adopt monotone chain rules to construct the coding scheme that achieves the dominant face of the region directly. (ii) When only one user achieves positive secrecy rate, this user performs wiretap coding scheme, whereas the user of zero secrecy rate performs usual single-user coding scheme.
• In both cases, we do not make any symmetry or degradation assumptions on the channel. Proper chaining schemes are constructed to deal with the general channel setting and to provide strong secrecy.
• A rigorous analysis is finally provided to validate the performance of the proposed scheme. The crucial part of the analysis is to make sure that the distribution induced by the encoder approximates the target distribution from which the polarization sets are defined.
C. ORGANIZATION AND NOTATIONS
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we introduce the MAC-CM model and recap its best-known achievable secrecy rate region. Preliminaries on polar coding techniques are reviewed in Section III. We present our polar coding scheme for the MAC-CM in Section IV. A rigorous analysis of the proposed scheme is conducted in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
Notations: Uppercase letters indicate random variables, whereas lowercase letters indicate the associated realizations.
[n] denotes the index set {1, 2, . . . , n} for n ∈ Z + . For any random variable X , X 1:n (X 1 , . . . , X n ) denotes a vector of n i.i.d. components. For A ⊂ [n], we write X 1:n [A] to denote the sequence {X i } i∈A , and A c the complement of A with respect to [n]. Let p X and pX be two distributions defined over the alphabet X . D(p X ||pX ) denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two distributions. V(p X , pX ) x∈X p X (x) − pX (x) denotes the total variation distance between two distributions. The generator matrix G n of polar codes is defined as in [6] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider secure transmission over a two-user MAC-CM as depicted in Fig. 1 . In this channel model, each user intends to transmit one confidential message to the destination, whereas information leakage happens due to the presence of channel outputs at users, i.e., Z 1:n 1 and Z 1:n 2 . As a result, each user treats the other user as eavesdropper and tries to keep its message as secure as possible. Self-interference is considered in the model, i.e., channel outputs at one user also depend on its own channel inputs, i.e., Z 1:n 1 can depend on X 1:n 1 , and Z 1:n 2 can depend on X 1:n 2 . Both users are assumed to be passive eavesdroppers in that, channel outputs at one user is only used to extract the other user's information, but not to facilitate its own transmission or disturb the other user's transmission.
• two encoding functions f k : W k → X 1:n k , which map the messages w k to a codeword x 1:n k , k = 1, 2; • a decoding function g : Y 1:n → W 1 × W 2 , which maps the channel output y 1:n to the messages (ŵ 1 ,ŵ 2 ). The code performance is evaluated by reliability and secrecy. Reliability is measured in terms of error probability
Secrecy is measured in terms of information leakage
Remark 1: Two Markov chains can be obtained from Definition 1, namely, W 1 → X 1:n 1 → (W 2 , Z 1:n 1 ) and W 2 → X 1:n 2 → (W 1 , Z 1:n 2 ). Therefore, (2) can be simplified to be L 1 = I (W 1 ; Z 1:n 2 X 1:n 2 ), L 2 = I (W 2 ; Z 1:n 1 X 1:n 1 ).
Definition 2: A secrecy rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (2 nR 1 , 2 nR 2 , n) codes such that lim n→∞ P e = 0 (reliability),
lim n→∞ L 1 = 0, lim n→∞ L 2 = 0 (strong secrecy).
The secrecy capacity region is defined as the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates. VOLUME 8, 2020 Remark 2: The secrecy constraints given by (5) are known as the strong secrecy, whereas the random coding scheme in [4] provides only weak secrecy, which is given by
Results under weak secrecy can be improved to strong secrecy by using privacy amplification [26] . In this paper, we provide an alternative approach for the MAC-CM using polar codes.
The best-known achievable secrecy rate region for the MAC-CM is given in Theorem 1, which was obtained in [4] under weak secrecy.
Theorem 1: An achievable secrecy rate region for the two-user MAC-CM is given by
where Conv(·) denotes the convex hull of a given set,
where
Remark 3: The random coding scheme [4] considers the scenario that both users also have a common message. We omit the common message here such that we focus on the polar coding design for secret messages. The common message can be embedded into our scheme using superposition coding [27] .
In this paper, out goal is to develop an explicit polar coding scheme that achieves R S in Theorem 1 under strong secrecy.
III. PRELIMINARIES ON POLAR CODES A. POLAR CODING FOR ASYMMETRIC CHANNELS
We recall the polar coding design for asymmetric channels [18] , [28] in this section. Consider a discrete memoryless channel p Y |X with binary input X and output Y . The goal is to approach the rate I (X ; Y ).
Define U 1:n = X 1:n G n , and the following polarized sets:
where δ n 2 −n β , β ∈ (0, 0.5), and Z (·|·) denotes the Bhattacharyya parameter. It is shown [29] that,
, for sufficiently large n. To construct the polar coding scheme, one can partition the index [n] as follows [28] :
1) ENCODING Letũ 1:n denote the realization of U 1:n . The encoder formsũ 1:n as follows.
•ũ 1:n [I] stores the information bits. First, I is suitable to contain uniformly distributed bits since I ⊆ H X . Further, I ⊆ L X |Y means that those bits within I can be reliably decoded.
•ũ 1:n [R] contains uniformly distributed random bits, which are shared between the encoder and the decoder. Let J ũ 1:n [R]. Note that, J can be reused over a sufficient number of blocks to make the induced rate loss negligible.
•ũ 1:n [D] contains almost deterministic bits sampled from the conditional probability P U i |U 1:i−1 . We use random decisions here like [18] .
Note that, is transmitted to the receiver separately with some reliable error-correcting codes. This transmission is shown to be negligible in terms of rate, i.e., | | = o(n) [18] . The encoder computesx 1:n =ũ 1:n G n onceũ 1:n is formed.
2) DECODING
The receiver obtainsũ 1:n [(L X |Y ) c ] through (J , ). Then the receiver decodesũ 1:n with the successive cancellation (SC) decoder [29] :
The error probability P e can be upper bounded by
with complexity O(n log n). The information rate is
B. POLAR CODING FOR MACS WITH MONOTONE CHAIN RULES
Monotone chain rules are first introduced for the Slepian-Wolf problem [19] , and then extended to two-user MACs [10] . Consider a two-user MAC p Y |X 1 X 2 with binary inputs X 1 , X 2 and output Y . The capacity region is the convex hull of all rate pairs satisfying
for which R 1 +R 2 = I (X 1 X 2 ; Y ) is referred to as the dominant face. Define U 1:n 1 = X 1:n 1 G n , U 1:n 2 = X 1:n 2 G n . Denote by S 1:2n (S 1 , . . . , S 2n ) an arbitrary permutation of U 1:n 1 U 1:n 2 . S 1:2n is said to be monotone if it preserves the relative order of the elements of both U 1:n 1 and U 1:n 2 . Accordingly, one can expand the mutual information I (U 1:n 1 U 1:n 2 ; Y 1:n ) as
where each term I (S l ; Y 1:n |S 1:l−1 ) polarizes to 0 or 1 as n goes to infinity. The rates of two users are defined as
It is shown that (R 1 , R 2 ) can be arbitrarily close to the rate pairs on the dominant face of (17) 
Partition the index [n] for user k as follows:
Then user k transmits X 1:n k = U 1:n k G n over the channel. On the other side, the receiver decodes U 1:n 1 and U 1:n 2 jointly using a SC decoder with the used permutation S 1:2n . The encoding and decoding complexity of this scheme are the same as the single-user case, which are O(n log n). For codes construction, the complexity can be made as low as O(n) using existing methods [10] .
IV. POLAR CODING SCHEME FOR THE MAC-CM
In this section, we develop an explicit polar coding scheme that achieves R S in Theorem 1 under strong secrecy. Specifically, R S mainly consists of three sub-regions, i.e., R
S , and R
S , for which we aim to consider the achievability separately as follows.
Achievability of R
(1) S : To obtain a nonempty R (1) S , we assume that max{R A , R B } > 0 and R C > 0. Then we have three cases to consider, i.e.
In Section IV-A, we construct the coding scheme using monotone chain rules such that we achieve the dominant face of R (1) S directly. For the second case, we have
We similarly have R
S for the third case. Achievability of R S due to symmetry. In this case, the target rate pair is (R A , 0), where user 1 achieves a positive secrecy rate and user 2 has a secrecy rate of zero. We develop the coding scheme achieving (R A , 0) in Section IV-B. In particular, the user with positive secrecy rate preforms usual wiretap coding scheme, whereas the user of zero secrecy rate performs single-user coding scheme.
Finally, the remaining rate pairs within R S (obtained by convexification) can be achieved by time-sharing.
We refer to the channel from both users to the receiver as the main channel. Obviously, the main channel is a typical two-user MAC, which is defined as p Y |V 1 V 2 . Moreover, we refer to the channel from both users to one of the them as the eavesdropper channel. Two eavesdropper channels, which are respectively defined as p Z 1 |X 1 V 2 and p Z 2 |V 1 X 2 , can also be viewed as two-user MACs since we take self-interference into consideration. In the following, we construct the coding scheme using monotone chain rules.
1) THE MAIN CHANNEL
The achievable rate region for the main channel is
of which the dominant face is R m1 
Due to the independence of U 1:n 1 and U 1:n 2 , one can rewrite H V k equivalently as
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Similar to (13) and (22), we partition the index [n] for user k as follows:
The encoder computes V 1:n k = U 1:n k G n and generates the channel input X 1:n k according to the conditional probability P X 1:n k |V 1:n k . Similar to (16) , the scheme can achieve the rate
According to Section III-B, (R m1 , R m2 ) is on the dominant face of (24), namely, R m1 + R m2 = I (V 1 V 2 ; Y ).
2) THE EAVESDROPPER CHANNELS
User 1 is an eavesdropper who has access to the side information (V 1 , X 1 ), whereas user 2 is an eavesdropper who has access to the side information (V 2 , X 2 ). Let d = {1, 2}\k, we define the following polarized sets
, for sufficiently large n. Furthermore, H V k |V d X d is equivalent to H V k given by (26) , as U 1:n k is independent of (V 1:n d , X 1:n d ). Then partition the index [n] as follows:
Compared to (13) and (22), here exists a slight difference. In particular, we use the high-entropy set H V k |Z d V d X d in the partition. Similar to (16), we have
Note that, the polar codes defined here can be viewed as polar codes for two-user MACs that achieve the corner points. For an arbitrary rate pair (R m1 , R m2 ) on the dominant face of R m , define R 1 R m1 − R e1 , and R 2 R m2 − R e2 . It is clear that (R 1 , R 2 ) is on the dominant face of R
3) CODING SCHEME FOR ACHIEVING R (1) S By combining (27) and (30) , the index [n] for user k can be partitioned as follows:
Due to symmetry, we mainly describe the coding scheme for user 1 in the following. A graphical representation of the partition for user 1 is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The partition defined by (32) results into five distinct subsets as follows. • I
a is the subset good for user 1 but bad for user 2, which makes it suitable to store user 1's secret message.
• I (1) b is the subset good for both users. Uniformly distributed random bits are assigned to I (1) b such that user 2 cannot extract any useful information.
a is the subset bad for both users. Uniformly distributed random bits are also assigned to R (1) a . Further, these bits are assumed to be shared among all terminals.
• R (1) b is the subset bad for user 1 but good for user 2. In existing literature, chaining construction is a useful technique to deal with this subset.
• D (1) contains the almost deterministic bits. A chaining scheme is proposed as follows (see Fig. 3 ). Let B (1) be an arbitrary subset of I 
Assume that the encoding scheme operates over m blocks and the notation j ∈ [1, m] indicates the jth block. The encoding chain is formed in that, for j ∈ [2, m], uniformly distributed random bits are placed in B (1) in Block (j − 1), and repeated (1) | uniformly distributed random bits, which represents the secret message. Let J 1 be a vector of |R (1) a | uniformly distributed random bits, which represents a source of common randomness available to all terminals. Let K 1 be a vector of |R (1) b | uniformly distributed random bits, which represents a secret seed shared by user 1 and the receiver. Letũ 1:n 1 denote the realization of U 1:n 1 in Block j. Then user 1 formsũ 1:n 1 as follows. ).
We assume that j is secretly shared by user 1 and the receiver. Also note that, | j | = o(n).
The remaining R (1) b in Block j is determined by chaining construction:
b ] stores the secret seed K 1 ; • Otherwise,ũ 1:n 1 [R (1) b ] is equal toũ 1:n 1 [B (1) ] of Block (j − 1). Onceũ 1:n 1 is formed, user 1 computesṽ 1:n 1 =ũ 1:n 1 G n . Finally, user 1 generates the channel inputx 1:n 1 by transmittingṽ 1:n 1 through a virtual channel with conditional probability p X 1:n 1 |V 1:n 1 (x 1:n 1 |ṽ 1:n 1 ). Remark 4: The encoding scheme requires an amount of shared randomness, which includes J 1 , K 1 , and m ( 1 , . . . , m ). Specifically, J 1 is a source of common randomness available to all terminals, K 1 and m are known only to user 1 and the receiver. We will prove in Section V that the rate loss induced by the shared randomness is negligible as m, n goes to infinity. Moreover, we will show that reusing J 1 over different blocks does not harm strong secrecy.
b: ENCODING SCHEME FOR USER 2
The encoding scheme for user 2 is obtained by replacing the subscript 1 by 2. The shared randomness required by user 2 is similarly defined as J 2 , K 2 , and m ( 1 , . . . , m ).
c: DECODING
The receiver jointly decodesũ 1:n 1 andũ 1:n 2 starting from Block 1 and going forward to Block m. Let Y n j denote the channel outputs of Block j, and S 1:2n j denote the monotone permutation used in Block j. Recall that,
The receiver decodesũ 1:n 1 as follows. In Block 1, the receiver obtainsũ 1: K 1 , 1 ) . Otherwise, the receiver obtainsũ 1:n 1 [(L V 1 |Y ) c ] via (J 1 , j ) and u 1:n 1 [B (1) ] from Block (j − 1). The receiver then forms an estimateû 1:n 1 , and extractsŴ j 1 using the following SC decoder:
The receiver decodesũ 1:n 2 using a similar SC decoder by replacing the subscript 1 by 2.
As discussed in Section III, the encoding and decoding complexity of the proposed scheme are O(n log n), and the construction complexity is O(n).
The target rate pair is (R A , 0), in which user 1 achieves a positive secrecy rate and user 2 has a secrecy rate of zero. We construct the coding scheme as follows. Instead of remaining silent, user 2 performs the coding scheme for single-user channels as described in Section III. The signals transmitted by user 2 do not store any secret message. User 1 treats user 2 as an eavesdropper, and perform the usual wiretap coding scheme. Note that, a similar scheme was proposed for the MAWC in [20] , where user 2's transmission is termed as cooperative jamming.
a: ENCODING SCHEME FOR USER 2
Define U 1:n 2 = V 1:n 2 G n . Consider the following polarized sets:
We partition the index [n] as follows:
User 2 aims to transmit the codeword to the receiver which does not store any secret message. Let J 2 be a vector of |R (2) | uniformly distributed random bits shared by user 2 and the receiver. The encoding scheme operates over m blocks. VOLUME 8, 2020 Letũ 1:n 2 denote the realization of U 1:n 2 in Block j. The encoder formsũ 1:n 2 as follows.
•ũ 1:n 2 [I] stores uniformly distributed random bits.
•ũ 1:n 2 [R] stores the vector J 2 . Note that we reuse J 2 over different blocks. The rate loss is made negligible by sufficiently large m. ).
. User 2 transmits j additionally to the receiver with some reliable error-correcting codes. Note that | j | = o(n). Onceũ 1:n 2 is formed, user 2 computesṽ 1:n 2 =ũ 1:n 2 G n , and generates the channel inputsx 1:n 2 according to the conditional probability p X 1:n 2 |V 1:n 2 (x 1:n 2 |ṽ 1:n 2 ).
b: ENCODING SCHEME FOR USER 1
Define U 1:n 1 = V 1:n 1 G n . Consider the following polarized sets:
Similar to (16) , we obtain the following results.
where (40) holds by the independence of V 1 and (V 2 , X 2 ). Assume that the encoding scheme operates over m blocks. Chaining construction is applied to deal with R b . Similar to (33) , the existence of B (1) is ensured by
The encoding procedure is similar to that described in Section IV-A, which we omit here for conciseness.
c: DECODING
The receiver first decodesũ 1:n 2 using a similar SC decoder as described in Section III-A. The receiver then computeŝ v 1:n 2 =û 1:n 2 G n , and proceeds to decodeũ 1:n 1 using a similar SC decoder as described in Section IV-A.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
We provide in this section an analysis of the coding scheme described in Section IV, which leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For a discrete memoryless MAC-CM given by
|X 2 | = 2, the polar coding scheme described in Section IV achieves the secrecy rate region R S given in Theorem 1 satisfying strong secrecy.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE SCHEME ACHIEVING R | in Block j. According to (33) , we have
where (R 1 , R 2 ) is on the dominant face of R
S . The rate of the shared randomness for user 1 is
Similarly for user 2, we have |(
Overall, the rate of shared randomness is negligible as m, n goes to infinity.
2) VARIATION DISTANCE
The joint distribution induced by the coding scheme is not exactly the same as the target joint distribution. The following lemma provides an upper bound on the total variation distance between these two distributions. 
Proof: For conciseness, we omit the subscript j in the induced joint distribution. Following similar steps as [23] , we can bound D(p V 1:n 1 ||pṼ 1:n 1 ) as follows.
where (a) holds by the polar transform U 1:n 1 = V 1:n 1 G n and the invertibility of G n , (b) holds by the chain rule for the divergence, (c) holds by the uniformity of the bits stored in H V 1 , (d) holds by the relationship between the entropy and Bhattacharyya parameter, (e) holds by the definition of H V 1 .
Similarly, we have 
Define the error event:
Note that E c,1 = ∅. Obviously, we have
j as follows.
where (a) follows from the error probability of a standard SC decoder, (b) follows from (48) and (49), (c) follows from induction. The last term in (50) can be similarly bounded as follows.
P[(Ũ 1:n 1 ) 1 = (Û 1:n 1 ) 1 ] = P[(Ũ 1:n 1 ) 1 = (Û 1:n 1 ) 1 |E 1 ]P(E 1 ) + P[(Ũ 1:n 1 ) 1 = (Û 1:n 1 ) 1 |E c 1 ]P(E c 1 ) ≤ P(E 1 ) + P[(Ũ 1:n 1 ) 1 = (Û 1:
Substituting (51) into (50), we obtain P (1) j ≤ j (η n + nδ n ) .
Similarly, we can bound P
(2) j ≤ j (η n + nδ n ). Finally, we bound the overall error probability P e as follows. Hence, the receiver can decode the secret messages with arbitrarily small error probability.
4) INFORMATION LEAKAGE
Without loss of generality, we consider the information leakage of user 1. First, we introduce some necessary notations. Let W 1:m . Let θ n 2nδ n + η n (n − log η n ).
• If j ∈ [1, m − 1], we have (L 1 ) j − (L 1 ) j+1 ≤ 2θ n ; • If j = m, we have (L 1 ) m ≤ θ n .
Proof: See Appendix. By using Lemma 2, we can bound (54) as follows.
The information leakage vanishes as n goes to infinity, such that strong secrecy (5) is satisfied.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE SCHEME ACHIEVING R (59)
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an explicit polar coding scheme for the MAC-CM based on monotone chain rules. We proved that the best-known achievable secrecy rate region for the MAC-CM can be achieved by polar codes satisfying strong secrecy. In this paper, feedback signals are only considered as the cause of information leakage. In fact, they can also be leveraged for user cooperation. The interaction between cooperation and secrecy in the MAC-CM has been studied in [32] , which introduced an achievable scheme based on compress-and-forward. Polar coding design for this scenario is left for future work.
